The variable quality of medical evidence in court, particularly its objectiveness and its reliability, is cause for serious concern. That medical expert evidence should be seen to be objective-the independent product of the expert uninfluenced by the exigencies of the litigation is uncontentious. The basis of this discussion is my personal experience in court, mainly in criminal cases of rape and child abuse, appearing as an expert witness at the behest of the prosecution and the defence, and to a lesser extent my personal involvement in child care cases, appearing both for parents and on instructions from guardians-ad-hitem and the courts. It is my view that miscarriages of justice, resulting in guilty persons going free and (one hopes much less commonly) innocent men being convicted or denied access to their children, are sometimes contributed to by the manner in which medical evidence is presented to the court.
A strong and national public concern exists at present about the low and falling rate of convictions in rape cases, which is now about 10% in the UK. Such cases are traumatic for all concerned, not least for the complainant, and also cost a great deal of public money. Controversies about the nature of the medical evidence arise because medical practitioners are acting for one or other side in the adversarial system; experts are sometimes guilty of proffering biased reports. These reports are then challenged by sometimes equally, but differently, biased medical experts cited for the defence. Such differences of opinion and of interpretation may cause the jury to lose sight of the real issue in the case-which is basically whether the complainant is telling the truth and should be believed, or otherwise. This applies to cases of both rape and child sexual abuse.
The Royal Commission on Criminal Justicel recognized difficulties with scientific (and perhaps also medical) evidence, and identified the pre-trial period as the appropriate time to sort out and define scientific issues of direct forensic interest2. This, however, may be easier said than done and the following are some of the pertinent issues.
Before the case comes to be heard in court, the case may be wrongly pursued because of undue reliance on medical evidence, which may not in fact be as strong as the lawyers believe it to be (or have been led by the expert to believe).
In the court itse!f, the medical evidence may be challenged and found wanting; for example, where a doctor relies too dogmatically on the evidence he or she adduces from the examination, while failing to acknowledge that there may be other, perhaps just as likely, causes for the findings that have been made clinically.
After the hearing in court, there are problems, not least for the victims. A child who has been diagnosed as sexually abused and given to understand throughout the proceedings in court that he/she has been damaged, when the actual findings were doubtful, scanty and even non-existent or the evidence to support the case was not strong, has certainly been abused, but not necessarily by the alleged offender. A complainant in a rape case in which there is no conviction may suffer great distress and feel that he or she has been on trial and been found guilty of lying: this may perhaps be contributed to by doubts about the reliability of the medical evidence.
In child care cases in the civil courts, since the implementation of the Children Act 1989, clear guidelines have been set down for the use of experts by the courts how reports should be prepared; how experts should meet and, where possible, agree the findings; reminding experts that their duty is to the court and not to the party instructing them3. Emotional involvement in the case and the desire for the instructing side to succeed-no matter how much this is in tune with elementary competitive instincts-should not form part of the remit of the expert medical witness. In rape cases and in child abuse cases heard in the criminal court no such guidelines exist, though sometimes a judge will ask the experts to sit down and agree where they can. EXPERT natural for a doctor to want to help the patient, but in a medico-legal context a degree of objectivity is essential.
When examining a complainant, it is important to remember that one is being made aware of only a small part of the evidence that will be presented in the court room. The medical examiner has a single account of events, which may or may not be entirely true, and usually little background information unless the complainant has already been interviewed by specially trained police officers and the resultant information together with statements from other witnesses made available before his/her clinical examination.
It can be illuminating and salutary to sit in court and hear the sometimes very different account of events that emerges from witnesses as the case proceeds. Perhaps it should be mandatory for expert medical witnesses to be present in court as the case unfolds; they would then be in a better position to assess their findings in the light of all the evidence presented. With such attendance in court, interpretation would perhaps be more objective; the opinions expressed would take into account all the facts available to the court. It is not entirely the fault of the examining doctor that reports and statements may seem to be biased. Essentially, he or she is asked only to consider whether the findings are consistent with the allegation, which they may be; but if more information were available, a more balanced opinion might be given. This does not, however, excuse behaviour such as the following.
Case I A young woman alleged rape and on examination was found to have injuries. The doctor's first statement described a tear about 2.0 cm long extending out from the hymen. The skin around the tear was macerated, wet and red looking. The doctor's opinion was 'there is medical evidence of a sexual assault sufficiently severe to cause a painful though superficial injury. I feel it is unlikely that consensual sex would result in an injury like this in extent'. A second statement was prepared some three months later and said: 'The tear at the 5-6 o'clock position was fresh. It extended right through the hymen extending just inside the vagina. Around the area was a further area of skin loss. The area was red, macerated and extremely sore. The whole lesion was approximately 2.0 cm long x 1.0 cm wide. This would have been very painful. Normal sex does not involve inflicting injuries of this extent.' What the doctor did not disclose in the statements was that she had also recorded in her notes 'itchiness and a vaginal discharge'. An order for disclosure of her general practitioner's notes enabled the expert cited for the defence to establish that the complainant had had numerous treatments for thrush and had been treated again for thrush shortly after that Following receipt by the Crown Prosecution Service of the defence expert's report, the examining doctor immediately prepared a third statement containing the following:
'I agree that the degree of redness, the creamy discharge, the maceration of the skin and some of the soreness are characteristic of infection with Candida. This possibility was in my mind when I spoke to her general practitioner after the alleged rape. The area infected is thus more friable and likely to tear on vigorous rubbing or pushing. Knowing that Candida was in fact present does help to explain the extent of the injury. I did not actually state that the tear was 2.0 cm long. I stated that the whole area of tear and surrounding macerated skin loss was 2.0 cm x 1.0 cm'
The doctor agreed that clumsy and vigorous penetration, in the presence of an infection with Candida, would explain the findings. Despite having this information, the Crown Prosecution Service chose to continue to rely on the medical evidence, and only on the day of the trial was an agreed statement, prepared by the defence and signed by the prosecution doctor, placed before the court. The defendant was acquitted. We will perhaps never know the truth of what took place in this instance and which version of events was correct, but what is certain is that all the evidence available should have been presented and recorded; all the evidence should have been evaluated, and possible alternative interpretations considered long before the indictment and the hearing.
Case 2
An 1 1-year-old girl alleged rape against two men who had been walking their dog in some fields. The child was medically examined. On that day, vaginal swabs were taken and a digital examination of the vagina was carried out: no injuries were found. No semen was found on swabs that presumably had been appropriately collected. She had a bath.
On the following day, she was taken to a university hospital for further examination. A 'fine wire swab' was passed into the vagina and one sperm head was reported to have been seen on that swab. Both the forensic scientist and the doctor stuck to their view that the one sperm head proved penetration. In this the clinical doctor was perhaps straying outside her direct field of expertise in giving an opinion on a basically scientific matter, and the forensic scientist was perhaps being too dogmatic. Both were showing bias towards those instructing them. Neither of them, I think, would have stood up in a professional examination.
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meeting and said what they said in court. If the men had been convicted, this would have been on evidence that was unsafe and unsound, but who would care? An appeal to a higher court is not guaranteed even when, in a serious and emotive case such as this, the evidence seems so scanty.
Case 3
In another rape case a medical practitioner claimed in the witness box that the injury to a girl's hymen could only have been caused by a penis and not by a finger, because 'the finger does not have much power'. This opinion must have caused the jury some amusement: many would have realized the doctor was talking nonsense. In that case the complainant was not sure whether penile penetration had occurred. If the doctor's opinion had not been so dogmatic then a charge of indecent assault might have been laid and successfully prosecuted, whereas the rape case failed. Much distress was caused to a naive but honest young woman when the defendant was acquitted.
Case 4
In another case a doctor stated in court that none of his internal vaginal swabs had been taken from inside the hymen but from the outer part of the vagina inside the labia minora. In this instance the inaccurate use of medical terminology and ignorance of basic anatomy led the prosecution to rely on forensic evidence of penetration in laying a charge of rape, reducing it to attempted rape half way through the case after hearing the doctor's evidence.
DEFENCE EXPERTS
Doctors who appear for the prosecution are not the only ones who show bias; some defence experts give similar cause for concern. A doctor, for example, who asserts that a 1.0 cm tear of the posterior fourchette is as much consistent with consensual intercourse as with rape is perhaps overstepping the mark. Whilst tears of the fourchette such as this can occur, they are not commonly seen in routine examinations for example, in general practice, genitourinary medicine or gynaecology clinics. Admittedly, women seldom do present themselves for a full internal examination after their first sexual intercourse, even when it has proved painful. Certainly the characteristics of an individual hymen may lead to dramatic bleeding on first sexual intercourse in rare cases, and that could have occurred in the case before the court. However, the doctor was claiming that the findings were equally consistent with consensual intercourse-which is highly unlikely to be so. A study of my own cases over 20 years indicated that injuries to the posterior fourchette were very much more common in young women alleging rape than in a similar group who had recently had unlawful (under age) but consensual intercourse.
PROSECUTION EXPERTS
The strength and quality of the medical evidence that might be available to the court could improve if the examining doctor saw all the statements in the case, in particular the full statement of the aggrieved person and the Proof of Evidence of the defendant, and was then asked to prepare an expert report considering all the facts, based on all the evidence and not just the medical examination. This is what takes place in civil litigation, in which the expert must consider all material facts.4 The conclusions must therefore not only be sensible and logical but also couched in a way that does not transgress this rule of evidence.
For the examining doctor to be accepted by the court as an expert witness would require some system of accreditation-evidence of postgraduate study (for example, possession of the Diploma in Medical Jurisprudence) and evidence of continuing hands-on experience in the field. Where the doctor conducting the initial examination was inexperienced, a more senior accredited doctor should be asked to look over the papers and advise the Crown Prosecution Service whether the case should still proceed, and, if necessary, also appear as an expert for the prosecution. SHOULD THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE BE RESTRiCTED TO PHYSICAL FINDINGS ALONE? Case 5 Generally, questions as to the truthfulness of a witness are matters for the jury and not the expert. But in one case there were legal arguments in the absence of the jury as to whether a paediatrician could say that he took into account the demeanour of the child and his own assessment as to whether she appeared to be telling the truth, as well as his clinical findings. This was a criminal case and the judge ruled that the evidence could be put before the jury. As doctors we are taught to evaluate the patient in a holistic manner, to listen carefully because 'he is telling you the diagnosis', to carry out an examination and appropriate investigations, to consider a differential diagnosis and to reach a diagnosis based on our clinical findings and also the impression that patient has left on us. The same principles should apply in cases of rape and child abuse but there is a danger of doctors, in an honest wish to assist their 'patient', straying into subjective territory in search of evidence to support the case (and occasionally withholding evidence which undermines the case). Experienced doctors in court have sometimes given evidence along the lines of 'that hymeneal cleft may be normal but we say it is not because we believe the child has been abused'. That is a very dangerous opinion and is cause for concern; but the professions of medicine and law must decide whether physical findings in child abuse should stand alone or be only a part of a 'jigsaw' and whether findings which can occur in unabused children can be used as evidence.
EVALUATION OF DOCTORS' KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDES
At a medical conference, I put questions to a hundred doctors who had been involved in the medical examination of sexually abused persons. The results were recorded by computer, with experienced and inexperienced doctors identified and their opinions recorded separately. There was a distinct divergence of opinion on questions such as, 'are labial adhesions in a child out of nappies a sign of abuse?'. Doctors, however, agreed that anal dilatation in the presence of stool was unlikely to be a sign of abuse (97% took that view). Slides of physical findings were shown and the doctors were asked to grade them as (a) normal, (b) variant of normal, (c) questionable, (d) abnormal but not necessarily abused, and (e) grossly abnormal and indicative of abuse. They were asked to give an opinion purely on the slide itself and vote again after being given details of the case history. In every case where the case history suggested that abuse was present the percentage of doctors diagnosing abuse rose quite dramatically. Where they were told that there was no abuse in the history, they moved in the opposite direction. For example, in a child with lichen sclerosus et atrophicus 13% of the experienced doctors judged that there was gross abnormality indicative of abuse, but none of them did so after hearing the history. Thus, had there been any suspicion of abuse in the child's background, findings which were agreed to be caused naturally would have been put forward as strongly indicative of abuse.
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
Who decides what is 'reasonable medical certainty'? In the USA, the Supreme Court ruled in the case of Dalbert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals that the scientific evidence at issue, which was whether children's limb deformities were caused by Bendectin, an antinausea drug taken by the mothers during pregnancy, should be evaluated by way of cross-examination in court. Lower courts had ruled that unpublished work, not peer reviewed and prepared solely for use in court, failed to meet the necessary standard for admission in court, in that it lacked general acceptance among scientists in the field.
The Supreme Court overruled this and placed the responsibility on the judge and jury to evaluate complex scientific evidence. In the UK the Court of Appeal has recently decided that a judge must decide between the views of two orthopaedic surgeons in an industrial injury concern that juries and even judges, trapped in a battle of the experts, may decide scientific or medical matters on the basis of empathy towards one party-or on whether an expert is a convincing witness-rather than on the medical facts.
PANELS OF EXPERTS
In the USA many medical and scientific matters are the subject of statements that represent accepted majority views. These statements are prepared by panels of recognized experts and are available to lawyers for the prosecution and defence as well as the judge. They should provide a foundation for the judge before trial, and an opposing expert should only be allowed to overcome the accepted view by presenting credible contrary evidence.
In rape and child abuse the quality of medical publications is not good enough to achieve this. Articles on child abuse and rape are commonly anecdotal, emotive and statistically unreliable, yet obscure articles are relied on in court without critical scrutiny.
A SINGLE EXPERT-WITNESS BODY?
In England there seems to be a proliferation of professional bodies for expert witnesses. I could join any or all of them by paying a fee and providing a few references, but there seems to be no reliable mechanism of certification or accreditation of the entrants and there are no satisfactory disciplinary procedures for those registered therein who are found wanting. Here I offer a proposal that is personal, not intended to reflect discussions at the Royal Society of Medicine (RSM) or elsewhere. I suggest that there should be one expert-witness body for medical witnesses alone and that this should be under the auspices of the Section of Clinical Forensic and Legal Medicine of the RSM, which should take the lead in setting up such a body, liaising with the medical Royal Colleges. The 'medical expert-witness body' should provide a database of reliable articles and a considered view of current thinking in all areas where medical expertise is requiredas is being done in mainstream medicine under the banner of evidence-based medicine. The RSM group could set standards and establish an accreditation system, and in most cases only experts so accredited should be able to give evidence in court. Disciplinary procedures should be in place with the sanction of removal from the experts' register for failure to uphold standards. New 'experts' should have an experienced mentor who sponsors their accreditation. An audit system should also be set up for clinical medico-legal work, with those wishing their accreditation to continue submitting cases annually to a panel for critical review. Experts should also be able to demonstrate evidence of continuing education in the subject. This would also raise the issue as to whether or not experts who are retired or no longer in active practice should continue to be accredited. The medical profession owes it to the courts, to the legal profession, to all the parties involved in criminal cases and to the public in general that standards of integrity and of expertise are fostered and maintained.
